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This research examines the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
performance through the findings of an empirical longitudinal investigation of public 
utilities listed on the Italian Stock Exchange (2000 -2008). The data for the measurement 
of the corporate governance variables are taken from the latest edition of the Italian 
Preda Code of Best Governance Practices (2006). Standard ratios (Return on Assets, 
Return on Equity, Return on Sales, Tobin’s Q and Book to Market Ratio) were used to 
assess the performance variables. The results are not conclusive. Specifically, whereas 
most relationships with the performance variables were statistically significant, different 
relationships were found between the same corporate governance variables and different 
indicators of performance. These ‘conflicting’ findings suggest that further research is 
needed for the impact of corporate governance practices on the performance of firms 
to be fully understood.
Introduction
What is the relationship, if any, between corporate governance and performance? Does 
the enhancement of “good” corporate governance practices effectively improve the 
profitability of firms? 
Corporate governance has become a topic of considerable interest in management 
studies (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). Nowadays, scholars are particularly interested in 
improving the comprehension of the possible relationship between corporate governance 
and corporate performance, with particular attention to listed firms. Despite the high 
commitment over the past decade, conclusive results on this relationship are still missing 
in the literature (e.g. Hambrick, van Werder and Zajac, 2008; Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni 
and Viganò, 2009).
With this research, we aim at contributing to fill this gap through the findings of an 
empirical longitudinal analysis regarding the population of the Italian public utilities 
listed on the Italian Stock Exchange (ISE) between January, 1st, 2000 and December, 
31st, 2008.
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Choosing this kind of population can result particularly significant for our goals. In fact, 
at general level, it is of common knowledge that the performance of public utilities has 
always been playing a pivotal role as far as the overall competitiveness of most of the 
nations worldwide is concerned. Furthermore, at country level, over the last twenty 
years the governance and management of the Italian public utilities have been affected 
by a number of organizational and legislative changes, such as the liberalization and 
privatization processes (e.g. Cafferata, 1995, 2010; Bognetti and Robotti, 2007; Grossi, 
2007; Grossi and Reichard, 2008a, 2008b; Abatecola and Poggesi, 2010; Argento, Grossi, 
Tagesson and Collin, 2010). 
In this paper, we follow the most recent international standards within the literature as 
for the operationalization of the (independent) corporate governance and (dependent) 
performance variables. In particular, we mainly derive the corporate governance variables 
from the most up-to-dated edition of the Italian Preda Code of Best Governance Practices 
(2006): i) number of non-executive and independent directors within the board; ii) CEO 
duality; iii) board size; iv) yearly presence of specific internal committees.
As for corporate performance variables, we use standard ratios, such as Return on 
Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Sales (ROS), Tobin’s Q and Book 
to Market Ratio (BMR). 
Our results on the investigated relationship are not wholly conclusive and this seems 
to support those theses which argue that understanding the real impact of corporate 
governance practices on the performance of firms still needs further improvement. 
On the one hand, most of the performance variables result statistically significant at 
single level. For example, as for Tobin’s Q and BMR, R2 is equal to 0.3544 and 0.3707 
respectively. On the other hand, most of these variables present conflicting relationships 
if associated with the same variable of corporate governance. For example, the presence 
of the Remuneration Committee is positively associated with Tobin’s Q, but negatively 
associated with BMR.
We structured the research as follows: first, we provide its theoretical framework; second, 
we highlight the research methods; third, we outline the statistical results; finally, we 
discuss our main findings and propose some implications of this study for further research 
and practice.
We primarily intend this paper for those board members, managers and scholars 
who want to enhance public governance, strategy and decision making by improving 
the comprehension of the possible relationships between the boards’ structure and 
composition, governance practices and corporate performance.
Theoretical Framework 
The relevance of corporate governance has been considerably growing among researchers 
and practitioners over the last 20 years and this is the result of a number of radical events 
all over the world, such as privatizations, macro-economic crises and financial frauds.
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At the very beginning, scholars have been intensively committed in investigating the link 
between corporate governance and the theory of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), 
mostly in terms of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) and property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990; Zingales, 1998). Nowadays, an always increasing interest regards 
the effective comprehension of the boards of directors’ internal behavioral dynamics. 
Although scholars have produced several enhancements on this topic over the last years, 
we can still consider boards, for some aspects, as “black boxes” (Daily, Dalton and 
Cannella, 2003; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Huse, 2007, 2009). 
In particular, over this decade researchers have been starting exploratory research to 
support the hypothesis that corporate performance can improve by adopting the best 
practices contained within the corporate governance codes issued worldwide after the 
global financial scandals (Becht, Bolton and Röell, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2003; 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Wood and Patrick, 2003). 
The empirical results from this kind of research are not conclusive. 
As far as the developing countries are concerned, researches generally find a positive and 
significant relationship between the corporate governance variables and the corporate 
market value (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005). However, these 
works do not agree on the impact of the same corporate governance variables on 
accounting ratios.
As far as the OECD countries are concerned, results seem contradictory too. In the U.S., 
for example, Gompers et al. (2003) find a positive and significant relationship between 
specific anti-takeover measures and Tobin’s Q, while Larcker, Richardson and Tuna 
(2007) find only a weak, although positive, relationship between Tobin’s Q and more 
standard corporate governance measures.
Moreover, while Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find a positive relationship between 
several corporate governance variables and accounting performance measurements, no 
relationship emerges as far as market based performance measurements are concerned. 
Brown and Caylor (2006) achieve similar results. 
Investigating on a sample of firms extrapolated from the FTSE EuroFirst 300 Index, 
Bauer, Giinster and Otten (2004) find no relationship between corporate governance 
variables and performance, both at accounting and market based level. Investigating 
on a sample of German public firms, Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann. (2004) 
obtain opposite results. 
In sum, on the one hand scholars find evidence that corporate governance, measured as 
an overall index, often leads to superior corporate performance (e.g. Alexander, Barnhart 
and Rosenstein, 2007; Schmid and Zimmermann, 2008; Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu, 
2010). On the other hand, the understanding of the relationship between performance and 
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specific measures of corporate governance needs more effort. For example, from some 
studies it emerges that an appropriate presence of independent directors increases firms’ 
profitability (Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; Lin, Ma and Su, 2009), while other studies 
arrive at opposite conclusions (Choi and Hasan, 2005; Cho and Kim, 2007). Similarly, 
while some findings support the hypothesis that small boards lead to better performance 
than bigger boards (Nguyen and Faff, 2006-07), the performance achieved by the latter 
boards seems to be more stable.
Methods
This section highlights the research methods, in particular: i) how we defined the 
dataset; ii) how we operationalized the (dependent) performance variables; iii) how we 
operationalized the (independent) corporate governance variables; iv) how we conducted 
the statistical analysis.
Dataset
We chose the population of the Italian public utilities listed at the ISE between January, 1st, 
2000 and December, 31st, 2008. The selected time period was chosen as the first edition 
of the Preda Code dates back to 1999. Thus, since this year, firms listed at the ISE have 
been strongly suggested to adhere to the corporate governance standards proposed by 
the Code, although this adherence is still not compulsory to date.
Efficient public services, at general level, have a positive impact on the competitiveness 
of nations. Furthermore, at country-system level, over the last twenty years, deep 
organizational and legislative developments have been affecting also the Italian public 
utilities. In this regard, scholars, practitioners and institutional policy makers could, at 
least, remember the privatization process and the European pressures towards market 
liberalization, as well as the growing consciousness of citizens as customers. 
In sum, what we have briefly outlined can contribute to explain why studying the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance can be of particular 
interest with specific regard to the investigated population.
As far as our inclusion/exclusion criteria within the population are concerned, 
we considered all the listed firms comprised within the “utilities”, “energy” and 
“telecommunications” sections of the ISE as “public utilities” in the research. In particular, 
our criteria for inclusion required for the firms within these sections to be quoted per at 
least one year during the time period under investigation.
In order to avoid duplications, we decided to eliminate those listed companies that 
belonged to groups whose listed holding was already present in the dataset. Through 
these criteria, we defined an overall population of 32 firms. 
For collecting the significant data about the population, we used official public sources, 
such as consolidated financial statements and corporate governance formal reports. Our 
total observations amounted to 288.
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Dependent Variables (Corporate Performance)
Scholars have recently adopted three main approaches to measure corporate performance: 
accounting based (e.g. Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 
2003), market based (e.g. Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003) or 
accounting/market based mixed approaches (e.g. Short, 1994; Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000; Evans, Evans and Loh, 2002). In this paper, we specifically used the third approach. 
In particular, we chose five performance indicators: two “stock” indicators, namely BMR 
and Tobin’s Q, and three “flow” indicators, namely ROE, ROA and ROS. Table 1 shows 
our operationalization of these indicators.
Independent Variables (Corporate Governance)
We derived the corporate governance variables from the latest edition of the Italian Preda 
Code (2006), whose main contents have always been based on the principles of agency 
theory. Table 2 shows these variables.
Table 1. Performance Measurements
Variable Label Operationalization
Book to Market Ratio BMR Shareholder Equity / Market Capitalization
Tobin’s Q Qtobin Market Value of Assets / Replacement Cost of Assets
Return on Equity ROE Net Income / Shareholder Equity
Return on Assets ROA EBIT / Total Assets
Return on Sales ROS EBIT / Revenues
Table 2. The Preda Code: Main Contents
Code 
Article Topic Main content
2.P.3. Non executive  directors 
The number of the non executive directors and the stretch of 
their powers should guarantee their considerable influence on 
the overall decision making activities of the board.
2.P.4.
Separation between the 
Roles of Chief Executive 
Officer and Chairman 
within the  Board 
These roles should be formally separated. The potential 
operational powers of a Chairman should be detailed in the 
General Board Review.
3 Independent Directors The number of the independent directors should be consistent in relation to the total number of the board directors.
6 Director Nominations’ Proposal Committee
A Committee should be specifically appointed to nominate 
directors. This Committee should mainly be made up of non-
executive directors.
7. Remuneration Committee
A Committee should be specifically appointed to evaluate the 
directors’ remuneration. This Committee should mainly be 
made up of non executive directors.
7.P.2. Directors’ Rewards A consistent percentage of the Directors’ rewards should be related to the firm’s performance.
8. Internal Control Committee
The code recommends the establishment of a Committee, 
whose structure should be mostly made up of independent 
directors.
Source: adapted from Abatecola and Poggesi (2010).
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Table 3 shows our corporate governance measurements for the analysis, which we mainly 
derived from the contents of Table 2. 
Among these measurements, “Board Size” is the sole corporate governance variable 
that does not receive any specific indication from the Code. However, we decided to 
include also this variable within the analysis as this variable has been widely considered 
by international research on corporate governance over the last years.
It is a matter of fact that developing an acceptable conceptualization of what a “good” 
corporate governance system is, has always represented – and still does – one of the 
most relevant challenges within this research area. The corporate governance variables 
that we specifically selected from the Code are those which scholars have been mostly 
using within this field over the years. 
Control Variable
We identified “Total assets” as the control variable for each firm within the 
population.
Statistical Analysis
Drawing on past quantitative analyses on the investigated relationship (e.g. Baysinger, 
Kosnik and Turk, 1991; John and Senbet, 1998; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; 
Core, Guay and Rusticus, 2006), we performed a linear regression with the “fixed 
effects” method (Nickell, 1981; Montgomery, 1991), with the years considered as dummy 
variables. We developed the following regressions on Stata 10:
We developed separate regression equations on stata 10 for qtobin, roa, bmr, roe and ros. 
Table 3. Corporate Governance Measurements
Variable Label Operationalization
Non-executive 
Directors Necda Number of Non-executive Directors / Board of Directors’ Size
Ceo Duality Ceod Overlap between the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman within the Board (1=YES, 0=NO)
Independent 
Directors Icda Number of Independent Directors / Board of Directors’ Size
Director 
Nominations’ 
Proposal 
Committee
Cpn Existence of  the Nominations’ Committee (1=YES, 0=NO)
Remuneration 
Committee Cpr
Existence of the Remuneration Committee
(1=YES, 0=NO)
Internal Control 
Committee Cci
Existence of the Internal Control Committee 
(1=YES, 0=NO)
Board Size Cda Number of Board Members, as yearly results on December, 31st.
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For example,
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In particular, we associated each performance variable indicator with all the corporate 
governance indicators and n-1 time-related dummy variables. We used the forward and 
backward “stepwise” method for choosing what variables had to be included in the 
model, according to their statistical significance. 
Research Findings
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for all the investigated variables. 
As for corporate performance, we can note that Tobin’s Q presents a mean value slightly 
higher than 1. We have also to emphasize that the maximum and range value of this 
variable are equal to 6.5057 and 6.1526 respectively. Both these values mainly derive 
from the over-capitalization registered by the Acotel Group in 2000. Similarly, ROE’s 
minimum value mainly derives from the performance of Tiscali in 2008. Moreover, ROE’s 
negative mean value has been mostly influenced by the overall population performance 
recorded in the last three years.
Table 4. The Investigated Population: Descriptive Statistics (2000-2008)
Variable Mean Max Min Sd Variance Cv Range Se(mean)
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
Qtobin 1.227492 6.505775 0.3531061 0.6820688 0.4652179 0.5556605 6.152669 0.0481094
ROE -0.323974 1.491957 -56.749 3.944422 15.55847 -12.17512 58.24096 0.2659329
ROA 0.0248731 0.3019546 -0.4888628 0.087258 0.007614 3.508134 0.7908174 0.0058829
BMR 0.7661299 3.418782 -0.0747901 0.4834864 0.2337591 0.6310763 3.493572 0.0341877
ROS -0.1272667 4.194762 -13.72131 1.356199 1.839277 -10.65635 17.91607 0.0914349
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Ceod 0.3037383 1 0 0.4609493 0.2124742 1.517587 1 0.0315098
Cci 0.9138756 1 0 0.2812212 0.0790854 0.3077238 1 0.0194525
Cpr 0.8 1 0 0.4009558 0.1607656 0.5011947 1 0.0276686
Cpn 0.1285714 1 0 0.3355248 0.1125769 2.609637 1 0.0231534
Cda 9.102326 21 3 3.188581 10.16705 0.350304 18 0.2174594
Necda 0.7635941 1 0.2857143 0.1382035 0.0191002 0.1809908 0.7142857 0.0098717
Icda 0.508022 0.9166667 0.1 0.2517671 0.0633867 0.495583 0.8166667 0.0179834
CONTROL 
Ta 11229.38 133207 11.93 25446.88 648000000 2.266099 133195.1 1715.628
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As for corporate governance, we can notice that while the Internal Control Committee 
(Cci) is present in quite all the firms within the population (its mean value is equal to 
0.9138), the Nominations’ Committee (Cpn) is almost absent (its mean value is equal 
to 0.1285). Finally, board size (Cda) is equal to about 9 members.
Table 5 shows the correlations between dependent, independent and control variables. We 
use the star (*) to indicate those correlations which are significant at the level of 20%. 
As we show in the table, Cda (board size) and Necda (number of non executive directors) 
express the most significant correlations to corporate performance.
Table 6 illustrates the results of the regressions. R2 ranges from the maximum value of 
0.3707 and the minimum value of 0.0188, because of its relationship with ROE and 
MBR respectively.
Some results from this table warrant additional discussion.
The model results very explanatory (R2 = 0.3544) for the relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and corporate governance variables. In particular, Tobin’s Q results positively associated 
with the Remuneration Committee, but negatively associated with non executive directors 
and board size. All the correlations generally present a good level of significance.
The model results very explanatory (R2 = 0.3707) also for the relationship between BMR 
and corporate governance variables. In particular, BMR results negatively associated 
with the Remuneration Committee, but positively associated with the Internal Control 
Committee and with board size.
As for ROA, the model is quite explanatory (R2 = 0.2687). This variable is positively 
associated with independent directors (Icda) and with the Remuneration Committee, but 
negatively associated with the Nominations’ Committee.
Table 5. Correlations
 Qtobin ROE ROA BMR ROS Ceod Cci Cpr Cpn Cda Necda Icda Ta
Qtobin 1
ROE 0.0069 1
ROA -0.0624 0.1508* 1
BMR -0.5295* 0.1176* -0.0971* 1
ROS -0.0876 0.0077 0.2552* 0.0477 1
Ceod 0.1227* -0.0995* -0.0366 -0.0642 0.0693 1
Cci -0.0417 -0.0174 0.1015* 0.061 -0.0214 -0.0138 1
Cpr 0.0391 -0.0301 0.3255* -0.1400* 0.0168 -0.0758 0.5785* 1
Cpn 0.0198 -0.0279 -0.1268* 0.0135 -0.0003 -0.0027 0.1182* 0.1921* 1
Cda -0.2129* 0.1231* 0.2394* 0.1732* 0.0316 -0.3187* 0.1799* 0.3429* -0.1548* 1
Necda -0.1909* -0.0006 0.1069* 0.0962* 0.0999* 0.1629* 0.0864 -0.0338 -0.2495* -0.2634* 1
Icda -0.0297 0.0976* 0.2147* -0.0282 0.1458* 0.0831 0.1644* 0.0266 0.0608 -0.2983* 0.3892* 1
Ta -0.0354 0.0476 0.3309* -0.0813 0.0930* -0.2295* 0.1245* 0.2064* -0.0947* 0.1317* 0.1998*0.1909* 1
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As for ROS, the model is still quite explanatory (R2 = 0.2129). While this variable is 
positively associated with independent directors, ambiguity emerges as far as the direction 
of its association with CEO duality and the Internal Control Committee is checked, in 
that the intervals of confidence show a discordant sign. 
Finally, as for ROE, the model is not sufficiently explanatory (R2 = 0.0188).
Discussion and Conclusions
Figure 1 presents a synthesis of the observed results. 
Three main evidences require specific discussion. First, the relationship between ROE 
and any of the corporate governance variables is not sufficiently explanatory and this 
seems to support those studies which raise some doubts on considering ROE as the 
variable most appropriate to this type of investigations (e.g. Barber and Lyon, 1996, 
Core et al., 2006; Bawhede, 2010).
Second, also CEO duality is not associated with any performance variable and this seems 
to support the current claim that more research is needed on the question whether duality 
positively affects performance or not (e.g. Daily and Dalton, 1992; Brickley, Coles and 
Jarrell, 1997; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Sonnenfeld, 2004).
Third, it mainly emerges that many corporate governance variables generally present a 
significant statistical relationship with corporate performance, but this relationship results 
conflicting when a specific corporate governance variable is associated with different 
performance variables.
For example, the evidence that regards both the non-executive and independent directors 
is ambiguous. We know that the question whether these kinds of directors (who can be
Table 6. Regressions
 qtobin bmr roe ros roa
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Cda -0.0423288 0 0.0430917 0 0.1592163 0.181 0.0016405 0.258
Ceod 0.3340736 0.079
Cci 0.3116616 0.013 -0.3815004 0.11
Cpr 0.3317224 0 -0.5086271 0 0.0603738 0.011
Cpn -0.0441975 0.009
Necda -0.6552323 0.034
Icda 0.7882617 0.023 0.0726713 0.005
Ta -2.17E-06 0.002 3.59E-06 0.118 5.60E-06 0.022 7.42E-07 0
_cons 3.080956 0 0.3249709 0.003 -1.96447 0.18 -0.5604253 0.048 -0.0794794 0.015
R-squared 0.3544 0.3707 0.0188 0.0632 0.2687
Obs. 184 184 186 187 188
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generalized as “outside directors”) positively affect corporate performance or not is 
still not completely addressed to date. In fact, while some studies find that outside 
directors help to boost performance (e.g. Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; El Mehdi, 2007, 
Lin et al., 2009), other studies arrive at opposite conclusions (Choi and Hasan, 2005; 
Cho and Kim, 2007). Not conclusive interpretations emerge also from this analysis. 
In fact, non-executive directors result negatively associated with Tobin’s Q, but do 
not present significant associations with accounting ratios and this evidence seems 
somehow contradictory. However, at first glance, we could explain the non-executives’ 
negative impact on Tobin’s Q as the tendency of market investors to appreciate less 
those companies whose board is composed of directors who are not very strategically 
active.
Moreover, the scenario becomes even more complex as far as interpreting the results 
pertaining to the presence of independent directors is concerned. First, this presence is
Figure 1. Summary of the Results
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not associated with market performance indicators, while it is positively associated with 
accounting ratios, such as ROA and ROS. Second, we have to carefully consider that 
independent and non-executive directors are kinds of directors whose substantial role 
within boards is not so different. For example, none of them is the first responsible for 
the board’s strategic planning. Thus, we could have expected that the relationships of 
these two corporate governance variables with corporate performance would have shown 
a substantially converging trend. This does not emerge from the analysis.
The evidence about the relationship between board size and corporate performance 
is contrasting too. In fact, board size is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q and this 
supports past evidence (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; 
Nguyen and Faff, 2006-07; contra Cheng, 2008), but positively associated with BMR. 
Also in this case, the scenario becomes even more ambiguous if we consider that board 
size is not associated with any accounting ratio.
We derive similar contradictory interpretations from observing the relationship between 
the presence of specific committees and corporate performance. For example, in the 
previous section we showed that the Remuneration Committee is positively associated 
with Tobin’s Q and ROA, but negatively associated with BMR. If we consider that 
this committee has a monitoring function, its positive associations seem to support the 
expectations provided by agency theory over the years. But this is also the reason for 
why its negative association with BMR results unexpected to us. Furthermore, BMR 
is also positively associated with the Internal Control Committee. Given that also this 
Committee has a monitoring role, we could have expected this kind of relationship.
Finally, the relationship between the Nominations’ Committee and corporate performance 
appears of modest interest as this committee is the least present within the observed 
population, although it is negatively associated with ROA. 
From this study, some interesting implications for further research on this topic also 
emerge. Some of them are related to the methods of this analysis.
First, neither the size of the population of the dataset nor the time period of the observations 
seem to constitute a limitation to this study, as we can detect similar consistence as far 
as recent research on corporate governance is concerned (e.g. Black, 2001; El Mehdi, 
2007; Garay and Gonzales, 2008; Omran, 2009).
Second, in this study we adopted a panel analysis to investigate on the overall relationship 
between corporate governance and performance. However, how these variables have been 
individually evolving over time remains to be investigated. In particular, the question 
of whether the overall corporate governance system of the investigated population has 
improved or not over time still remains open. Although answering to this question was 
not a specific goal of this research, it can be very interesting both at general and at specific 
level. In particular, as far as interpreting these results is concerned, this kind of answer 
can help to provide the analysis with a better overall understanding.
Third, it should be taken into account that investigating on the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance can produce incomplete interpretations if 
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corporate strategy is not properly considered. This seems particularly crucial as for the 
dataset of this analysis. In fact, we have stated that radical strategic and organizational 
changes have been affecting the Italian public utilities over the last 20 years. In particular, 
the pressure towards liberalization and privatization in the utility sector has been leading 
public utilities to develop, according to the cases, reactive or pro-active strategies which 
we did not specifically explore in this paper.
Fourth, we believe that a physiological limitation can be found in those analyses, such 
as this, that, although widely diffused in the literature to date, are built primarily on 
secondary data. Who are the people sitting within the board? Who are the people in 
charge of the various control committees? Are the formal independent directors “really” 
independent? How do the internal governance processes work and what impact can they 
have on performance? Qualitative primary data on these topics can be very suitable for 
complementary expanding the overall significance of research efforts within this area. 
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